The Adjudication and Enforcement of Rights After Brexit by Yong, A. et al.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Yong, A. ORCID: 0000-0002-3939-6781, O'Connor, N., Jancic, D., Harvey, D., 
Boyle, K. and Zahn, R. (2018). The Adjudication and Enforcement of Rights After Brexit. 
Edinburgh, UK: The Brexit and Rights Engagement Network (BREN). 
This is the published version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/21283/
Link to published version: 
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3235249 
The Brexit and Rights  
Engagement Network 
(BREN) 
 
 
 
 
 
The adjudication and  
enforcement of rights  
after Brexit 
 
 
 
 
 
Report of a roundtable held on 3 July 2018  
at the University of Edinburgh 
(compiled by Laura Bremner) 
 
 
 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3235249 
BREN: The adjudication and enforcement of rights after Brexit 
Compiled by Laura Bremner 
 
2 
 
  
ABOUT BREN 
The Brexit and Rights Engagement Network (BREN) comprises a group of early career legal researchers 
exploring the areas of rights, devolution and Brexit. The network is supported by a British Academy Rising 
Star Engagement Award and led by Dr Tobias Lock of Edinburgh Law School. It aims to provide younger 
scholars with an opportunity to share the findings of their research with an external audience of 
stakeholders. Further roundtables will take place in Belfast and London. 
 
BREN consists of the following members: 
 
Dr Katie Boyle, Associate Professor, University of Stirling 
Dr Alan Greene, Senior Lecturer, University of Birmingham 
Darren Harvey, Early Career Fellow in EU Law, University of Edinburgh 
Dr Davor Jancic, Lecturer, Queen Mary, University of London 
Dr Amanda Kramer, Research Fellow, Queen’s University Belfast 
Dr Tobias Lock, Senior Lecturer, University of Edinburgh (BREN Coordinator) 
Dr Kasey McCall-Smith, Lecturer, University of Edinburgh 
Nina Miller, PhD researcher, University of Glasgow 
Niall O’Connor, Lecturer, University of Essex 
Dr Huw Pritchard, Lecturer, Cardiff University 
Dr Anni Pues, Lecturer, University of Glasgow 
Dr Kirsteen Shields, Lecturer, University of Edinburgh 
Dr Adrienne Yong, Lecturer, City, University of London 
Dr Rebecca Zahn, Senior Lecturer, University of Strathclyde 
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INTRODUCTION  
This report records the inaugural meeting and roundtable of the Brexit and Rights Engagement Network 
(BREN) on Tuesday 3rd July 2018 at Edinburgh Law School.  Attendees at the roundtable included network 
members, fellow academics, representatives of the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish Government, the 
Scottish Human Rights Commission, the Equality and Human Rights Commission, the legal professions, 
and NGOs. 
Two years after the EU Referendum and only a few days after the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 
(the 2018 Act) receiving Royal Assent, the Brexit and Rights Engagement Network met for the first time. 
The purpose of the roundtable was to ignite debate amongst legal scholars and policy makers, and others 
working in a rights environment relating to interpretation, adjudication and enforcement of rights in the 
lead up to, and following “Brexit Day,” (March 29, 2019).1   
By way of introduction, Dr Lock proposed that some rights will probably be lost following the UK’s 
departure from the EU, but the extent of the changes are still unclear. There is also a lack of clarity or 
agreement on the nature of the relationship between the UK and the EU, but the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Act 2018 does go some way to answering some of our enquiries.  
It was noted that no changes were made to the Bill, despite the House of Lords’ vote to retain the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights after Brexit.2 A little insight was given to the general flavour of the Act, and 
negotiations so far. Looking more closely at the legislation, in addition to the specific repeal of the European 
Communities Act 1972,3 Schedule 1 para 3 of the Act, states that “No general principle of EU law is part 
of domestic law on or after exit day if it was not recognised as a general principle of EU law by the European 
Court in a case decided before exit day (whether or not as an essential part of the decision in the case).” 
Therefore EU law which was enacted / ruled before exit day will remain part of UK law, and therefore UK 
citizens still have these rights, however, this rule is a little inane, given that paragraph 3 of the same Schedule 
states that “There is no right of action in domestic law on or after exit day based on a failure to comly with 
any of the general principles of EU Law”; and “No court or tribunal or other public authority may, on or 
after exit day—(a)disapply or quash any enactment or other rule of law, or (b)quash any conduct or 
otherwise decide that it is unlawful, because it is incompatible with any of the general principles of EU 
law.”  Even though this does not apply to any proceedings commenced within three years of exit day,4 in 
the longer term there will be no mechanism for enforcing these retained EU rights.  
                                                          
1 Financial Times, “Brexit timeline: key dates in UK’s divorce with EU” 22 June 2018. 
https://www.ft.com/content/64e7f218-4ad4-11e7-919a-1e14ce4af89b Last accessed 6/07/18 
2 BBC, “EU Withdrawal Bill suffers third Lords defeat on human rights charter https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-43872520 Last accessed 08/07/18. 
3 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, s1. 
4 See European Union Withdrawal Act, Schedule 8, para 39 (5). 
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This report is split into two sections, Part A will consider the adjudication of EU rights, but also their 
enforcement under the 2018 Act and the Withdrawal Agreement, whilst ‘options for the future’ will be 
broached in Part B.  
 
Most of the contributions to this roundtable have been published as blog posts on the Europa Institute’s 
Europeanfutures blog.  They can be found here: http://www.europeanfutures.ed.ac.uk/topics/bren 
 
Furthermore, there are audio recordings of the roundtable available, which can be found here:  
Part 1: https://edin.ac/2NJ7Dbi  
Part 2: https://edin.ac/2LNzvdO  
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A) ADJUDICATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS UNDER 
THE WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT AND THE EUWA 
(1) “Missing parts of the future adjudication of EU Citizens’ rights in the UK” 
 
Dr Adrienne Yong, City, University of London 
Focusing specifically on deportation and the right to remain in the current climate within the UK, Yong 
considered the ‘missing parts’ of future adjudication of rights post-Brexit with the background of existing 
EU and UK law.  
What’s the law? 
Firstly, the stark contrast was drawn between European position on deportation, which tends to be 
protective and only permits expulsion on grounds of public policy or security5 compared with the position 
in the UK, where there is a presumption of automatic deportation if the foreigner is convicted of an 
offence.6 The level of protection increases the longer a resident has been living in a member state. An 
expulsion decision can only be taken against those who have been living in the Member State for more than 
10 years or for minors in the event of “imperative grounds of public policy.”7  However these grounds are 
open to interpretation by the Member State.8 The case of Tsakouridis9 highlights that a Member State cannot 
expel a resident purely based on a prior conviction. Going even further, the case of PI10, a long-term Italian 
resident was convicted for sexual assault and rape of a minor within his family and was not deported because 
the matter was not of interest in terms of public security.  
What’s the problem? 
The speaker firstly addressed changing attitudes towards EU free movement. She highlighted that societal 
sentiments were helping to drive an increasingly harsh deportation policy, citing changing attitudes towards 
free movement since the Maastricht Treaty. She also cited an amplification in xenophobia dominating the 
Brexit vote, as well as a widespread increase in right-wing populism. She highlights that the number of EU 
citizens being deported from the UK has sharply increased from 3435 in June 2015, to 5301 to June 2017.11   
                                                          
5 Directive 2004/38, Article 28. 
6 UK Borders Act 2007, s32(1). 
7 Directive 2004/38, Article 28 (3). 
8 Directive 2004/38, Article 28 (3). 
9 C-145/09 Land of Baden-Württemberg v Panagiotis Tsakouridis [2010] ECR-I 11979. 
10 C-348/09 P.I. v Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheid (judg 22 May 2012). 
11 How many people are detained or returned? https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-
statistics-april-to-june-2017/how-many-people-are-detained-or-returned Accessed 10/07/18. 
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Secondly, Yong discussed the issue of EU rough sleepers being deported. As set out above, the EU position 
on the right to remain is that deportation is generally only on serious or imperative grounds of public policy 
or public security. However, the UK Home Office had taken the decision that homelessness could be shoe-
horned into this policy concern and that the presence of homeless EU citizens living in the UK was contrary 
to public policy. This was challenged in the case of Gureckis and Others12 where it was held that the Home 
Office policy on ejecting rough sleeping EU residents was contrary to EU law, and furthermore 
“[a]ccommodation, or the lack thereof, in the host Member State had no connection to freedom of 
movement rights and requirements, and was not a factor taken into account in the Treaties or Directive.”13 
Finally, Yong referenced to Theresa May’s interview with the Telegraph in 2012, in which she vowed to 
create a ‘hostile environment for illegal immigrants’14 and admitted that this has been further evidenced by 
the current increase in deportation of EU migrants as well as Windrush scandal. Further, Operation Vaken 
was discussed – and Yong highlighted that only 11 people left the UK voluntarily. Unsurprisingly, given 
the government’s stance on immigration and increased number of deportations, the UK was investigated 
by the EU over their deportation of EU citizens.15 
What’s missing? 
There is no real protection from expulsion for EU citizens, and this suggests that there may well be no 
guarantees for EU citizens in the final Brexit deal. This is because the UK stance and law on immigration 
is more punitive. She outlined three main issues still to be tackled. Firstly; there is no clear position on 
protection for Zambrano carers,16 individuals who care for EU citizens, but are not themselves EU citizens, 
second; the reality that under British law there is little protection from expulsion for EU citizens resident 
in the UK, and these people would otherwise be protected under EU law, and thirdly; that the Home Office 
have taken a hard line in their Settled Status guidance,17 and effectively, no foreign criminals can settle in 
the UK.  
Yong concluded by outlining that it is crucial to ensure adequate protection of citizens’ rights post-Brexit 
but that much is left unclear until we have a clearer understanding of the relationship between the UK and 
the EU.  
                                                          
12 [2017] EWHC 3298 (Admin). 
13 [2017] EWHC 3298 (Admin), paragraph 98 per Mrs Justice Lang. 
14 Theresa May interview: 'We’re going to give illegal migrants a really hostile reception’ 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/9291483/Theresa-May-interview-Were-going-to-
give-illegal-migrants-a-really-hostile-reception.html Accessed 11/07/18. 
15 Brussels investigates UK over deported EU citizens   
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/sep/30/brussels-uk-deported-eu-citizens Accessed 11/07/18. 
16 C-34/09 Zambrano [2011] ECR-I 01177. 
17 Home Office, ‘EU Settlement Scheme: Statement of Intent’ (21 June 2018) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/718237
/EU_Settlement_Scheme_SOI_June_2018.pdf> accessed 1/8/18.  
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(2) “Brexit Britain’s ECJ problem: Enforcement of rights guarantees in the Withdrawal 
Agreement” 
Dr Davor Jancic, Queen Mary University of London 
A key question within the Brexit negotiations is the extent of influence the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
will have after the Brexit, both during the potential transition period and afterwards. Will the ECJ have an 
influence, and if so, how much of an influence will this be?  
UK opposition to the ECJ  
It appears that the ECJ’s unpredictable authority is concerning to the UK in two ways.  It is ‘unpredictable’ in 
the sense that the government cannot be certain regarding how case law will be interpreted or construed 
by the ECJ. ‘Authority’ means that the court has jurisdiction over issues which can affect UK citizens in a 
very significant ways. The 2018 EU (Withdrawal) Act attempts to limit the ECJ’s influence on post-Brexit 
Britain. However, the Union itself seeks to retain the authority of the court through the Withdrawal 
Agreement. Both of these documents will be considered.  
EU insistence on ECJ jurisdiction – the Withdrawal Agreement.  
On 26 May 2018, at the FIDE Congress in Lisbon, Michel Barnier, the EU’s Chief Negotiator for the Brexit 
process, explained why ECJ jurisdiction over the process is key. In Jancic’s words, “the withdrawal 
agreement is not your usual treaty, and the ECJ is not your usual international court.” The Court insists on 
retaining its jurisdiction in order to preserve the autonomy of EU law as any rivalling interpretation of EU 
law could challenge the authority of the ECJ.  
The ECJ in the draft Withdrawal Agreement – five considerations 
1. Entrenchment of existing EU law: Retained European Union law will have same legal effect as it has 
now within EU and its member states. This preserves the effect of EU law; however, the UK 
parliament are clearly at pains to change this.  
2. Creeping effect: There is significant potential for EU law to creep into UK law without any input or 
scrutiny from the British parliament. For example, if certain categories of retained EU law are 
amended, then such amended law will have effect without the UK having had an opportunity to 
critique or comment on its content.  
3. ECJ retains full jurisdiction over the transition period - and beyond: If the facts of a case occurred before 
the end of the transition period, opinions may still be sought from the ECJ. Further, in the event 
of an infringement of EU law by the UK before of during the transition period, the UK might be 
subjected to financial sanctions after Brexit has taken place.  
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4. Due regard for ECJ judgements: Under the draft withdrawal agreement, British courts would have to 
interpret EU case law in light of ECJ judgements by giving ‘due regard’ to it. If this is the case, it 
means that British courts may still use ECJ case law to interpret UK law. Further, during the eight 
years following the transition period, British judges would still be able to ask the ECJ for assistance 
by requesting preliminary rulings, especially concerning residence rights.18  
5. Disputes between EU and UK: It appears that any dispute could be submitted to the ECJ, and if the 
decision of the court is not respected, the repercussions could be a financial sanction or even the 
suspension of the withdrawal agreement. Further, in such a situation, even the suspension of the 
withdrawal agreement would be decided upon by the court. Finally, during the transition period, if 
ECJ decisions are not implemented, the EU could suspend the UK’s access to the single market.   
The UK response 
The current approach in the UK is clearly at odds with the tone and wording of the Withdrawal Agreement 
drawn up by the Union. One clear example of this is that according to the 2018 EU Withdrawal Act, British 
courts and tribunals cannot refer cases to the ECJ on or after Brexit day.19 This rule is at odds with the 
EU’s Draft Withdrawal Bill, which permits referrals for 8 years after Brexit.20 Further, the 2018 Act does 
not retain EU directives, as these are already implemented in UK law. At present, the UK shares the 8th 
place with Germany on the list of highest rates of the non-implementation of directives. The UK also very 
frequently asks the ECJ for preliminary rulings.  
Conclusion 
The closer the UK is to the EU, the higher the authority of the ECJ. Even if there is no withdrawal 
agreement, the ECJ will still affect lawmaking in third countries, which the UK will be after Brexit, in terms 
of setting regulatory standards. It is evident that much is still uncertain, and that it is necessary to distinguish 
the UK’s future relationship with the European Union. There is also a lack of symmetry between rights and 
remedies due to the UK’s retention of EU law and ECJ case law, but refusal to allow access to the ECJ. 
  
                                                          
18 European Commission Draft Withdrawal Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, Article 
151  
19 EU (Withdrawal Act) 2018, s6(1)(b)  
20 European Commission Draft Withdrawal Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, Article 
151  
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(3) “Enforceability of employment rights after Brexit” 
Dr Rebecca Zahn, University of Strathclyde 
Introduction  
Zahn began by highlighting that there are various EU derived employment rights, such as annual leave, 
however the EU has limited competence in the employment sphere. There is no coherent body of 
employment law which comes from the EU. Legislation has instead created a ‘patchwork of rights’ including 
individual rights, health and safety, some collective rights and equality. It follows that there are limited UK 
legislative capabilities in these areas.  
In general, EU law tends to favour widening protections for workers. Furthermore, case law from the 
European Court of Justice in employment cases can be contrasted with the approach taken in tribunals and 
courts in the UK, where a narrow interpretation of employment rights is taken. It should be noted that 
‘Employment’ is a reserved matter under the Scotland Act 199821 so there are significant limits on Scotland’s 
competency in this area. 
Employment law and Brexit 
In January 2017, at her Lancaster House speech, Brexit’s impact on employment law was addressed by 
Theresa May. The Prime Minister promised that the Government would not only “protect the rights of 
workers’ set out in European legislation, [they would] build on them.”22  This pledge has since been strongly 
contradicted by ministers, such as Michael Gove, with indications that the Working Time Regulations could 
be amended or scrapped. However, the overall picture is that May has not guaranteed any of our current 
EU derived rights, nor their enforceability post-Brexit, to date.  
Current enforcement of EU law in UK 
EU derived laws take primacy over UK law and limit UK legislative competency. UK courts also must give 
direct effect to rights which are sufficiently clear. UK courts must interpret domestic law in accordance 
with EU law. Infringement proceedings can be brought against the UK government for non-compliance 
with European law. Further, the Court of Justice can be asked to decide on questions of non-compliance 
with EU law through preliminary references. Finally, Francovich damages may also be available where a 
member state has failed to implement an EU directive into domestic law and has caused loss to a citizen of 
that member state.  
                                                          
21 Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 5, Part II, Head H. 
22 The government's negotiating objectives for exiting the EU: PM speech. 
 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-
speech Accessed 24/07/18.  
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Working Time Regulations 1998 
The Working Time Regulations implemented the 1993 Directive in the United Kingdom. Prior to this, no 
statute covered annual leave, rest breaks etc. and all agreement of this nature were derived from individual 
employment contracts and collective agreements. The UK refused to implement the Directive initially, and 
challenged it, then the Court of Justice ruled that it had been properly adopted and so would have to be 
implemented in the UK. If the UK had not implemented, the Commission could have brought a case 
against the UK. Individuals have relied on the directive, if their employer is the state or a subdivision of the 
state, due to the principle of ‘direct effect.’  If the directive had been wrongly implemented, there would 
also be the possibility of claiming Francovich damages. The ECJ has continued to update the law in this 
area, for example, with the rulings that annual leave planned when an individual is sick must be given back, 
on-call time counts as working time, and the right to annual leave as a ‘Day 1’ right, rather than an accrued 
one. These cases have had an impact on UK working life, however the United Kingdom is, at present, 
unable to overrule or amend the law arising from these cases due to the supremacy of European Law.  
Prospective enforcement of EU law in UK 
In the event of ‘hard-Brexit’ where the UK leaves the single market and custom union, the enforcement 
mechanisms available would be rather different. Under the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018, UK citizens would 
no longer have access to the ECJ. The Commission will no longer be able to bring infringement proceedings 
against the UK where there is no implementation of a directive or the UK does not perform its obligations 
under a Directive.23 The option of referring a case to the Court of Justice for a preliminary reference will 
clearly no longer exist, and this will have significant repercussions for employment law protections in the 
UK, given the impact that such references have had in terms of widening employment rights protection. 
For example, the upper cap on compensation in cases involving discrimination had been removed, it is 
likely that this decision may well be reversed, introducing an upper cap once again.  
Furthermore, given that pre-Brexit ECJ case law would have the same status as decisions of the Supreme 
Court, it could be overturned by the Supreme Court or by an Act of Parliament, which does not provide 
reassurance in terms of rights protection. Considering also remedies here, Schedule 1 of the 2018 Act 
removes Francovich damages as a remedy.24 
The supremacy of EU law is retained in respect of retained EU law.25 Further, under the EU Withdrawal 
Act, any EU derived rights which were available prior to Brexit, will be “enforced, allowed and followed 
accordingly”.26  The mirror image of this is that EU law enacted after Brexit day or if the direct effect of 
that law had not been established by Brexit day, that law will not have supremacy over UK law. This will 
                                                          
23 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, s6. 
24 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, s6. 
25 S5(1) and (2) 2018 Act.  
26 S4(1) 2018 Act. 
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include amendments of retained EU law, and as such, could mean that any amendments to the Written 
Statements Directive27 would not have effect in UK law.  
In the UK, most individuals work for private employers, therefore relying on indirect effect, which may 
still apply after Brexit. However, retained EU case law is not binding. Although British courts and tribunals 
may well use ECJ jurisprudence as persuasive authority, equally so, our home-grown judicial interpretation 
may well be far narrower than the European stance on a given issue.  
Conclusion  
To conclude, it appears then that enforcement of EU derived rights may be entirely dependent on the 
national legal system within the UK. Ultimately, this could mean that we closely follow the decisions of the 
European Court of Justice, or that we take a narrower approach. This will depend on two variables, namely 
i) judicial interpretation, which could continue with the status quo, or close attention being paid to ECJ 
case law, or something altogether different, and ii) which party is in government. In short, the ‘protective 
umbrella’ of EU enforcement mechanisms has been removed. 
Is there any alternative to these sparse enforcement mechanisms? The short answer is no, because there is 
no equivalent international body which provides the same hard law provisions and enforcement 
mechanisms. By contrast, the International Labour Organisation and the European Social Charter are rather 
toothless when compared with the European Union and its accompanying enforcement mechanisms. In 
terms of the Social Charter, it should be minded that their decisions are not binding, and that the UK has 
repeatedly been criticised for not implementing the provisions in the Charter. Finally, can the Scottish 
government do anything different? There is a larger public sector in Scotland, therefore more opportunity 
for individuals to utilise direct effect but otherwise unlikely. 
 
  
                                                          
27 Directive 91/533/EEC. 
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(4) Discussion 
Article 151  
Firstly, as proposed under Article 151 of the draft Withdrawal Agreement, British courts may refer cases 
regarding rights of the residence to the Court of Justice for eight years after Brexit. The first two speakers, 
Yong and Jancic, were questioned on their views of the eight-year limitation period, in terms of protecting 
citizens’ rights (addressed to Yong) but also in terms of the autonomy of EU law (addressed to Jancic).   
Yong perceived the time scale to be arbitrary and stated that she had no idea regarding the thinking behind 
this. The implementation of EU rights could well become a grey area. Jancic agreed that the limit does 
appear arbitrary but proffered that the prolonged period of ECJ jurisdiction is for new citizens to acquire 
settled status. He added that he was not quite sure why this specific length of time had been selected.   
The ‘level playing field’ 
Next, the concept of the level playing field regarding employment rights was discussed. Zahn highlighted 
that this would depend on what the relationship with the EU would look like, for example, if the agreement 
was that the UK remained in the European Economic Area, it would be likely that the UK would need to 
retain all existing and also, new European employment laws. Even if the eventual agreement is merely an 
EU-UK trade deal, it is unlikely that the UK will be allowed to dilute employment rights. However, even if 
that is the case, the supremacy of EU law will fall away, and domestic courts will be unable to ask for 
references from the ECJ. Given that the UK using its opt-out as much as possible, for example with the 
Working Time Regulations, it is unknown whether the EU would spur into action if the UK allowed British 
workers to work 80-hour weeks.  
Lock highlighted that having looked at the Commission’s take on the security relationship between the EU 
and UK, it appeared that if the UK was to have a security relationship with EU, the UK would still have to 
comply with and stay signed up to the ECHR.28  
Later in the discussion, the group moved back to what it really means to have a ‘level playing field.’ If we 
consider existing EU trade agreements with EU countries, the more recent ones have a labour clause 
inserted, which is even weaker than the ones which the US inserts. The majority of agreements include 
weak protections when considering the status quo, incorporating International Labour Organisation 
standards such a ‘no child labour.’ Conceivably, the EU could well require that labour standards do not fall 
below the level existing on Brexit day. The UK has been very resistant to labour inspections and imposing 
                                                          
28 EU could cancel Brexit security deal if UK quits European Court of Human Rights, The Telegraph 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2018/06/18/eu-could-cancel-brexit-security-deal-uk-quits-european-
court/?WT.mc_id=tmg_share_tw Accessed 21/07/18. 
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EU employment law, such as the Working Time Directive, which again suggests that the UK will wish to 
step away from this.  
Deportation  
The European Parliament’s view on the Home Office stance on deportation was also queried. The 
Parliament generally takes a strong view on citizens’ rights and will have a vote on the Withdrawal 
Agreement. The Parliament have not expressed their distain but appear to disagree with it. The UK High 
Court has been vocal in its contempt for the Home Office policy.  Lock added that the Withdrawal 
Agreement might well iron this out.  
It was suggested that if member states wished for the European Parliament to vote in a particular way in 
relation to the Withdrawal Agreement vote, then this is what would happen, as the members of parliament 
are effectively whipped by the member states they represent. 
The issue of access to justice in deportation cases was later discussed, and it was suggested that where rough 
sleepers were being deported, there was little time for the EU citizen to hire a lawyer, or even consider the 
possibility of an injunction. The Home Office has not produced a time line on the new immigration rules.  
UK citizens living in EU member states  
Finally, it was considered whether UK citizens living in EU member state are protected.  There is a missing 
article in the draft Withdrawal Agreement which is still to be decided to cover this category of individuals. 
UK citizens are in a stronger position as they will still be within the EU system, for example if the individual 
commits a crime. It is unknown whether the Withdrawal Agreement would have direct effect in the other 
member states. It was assumed that it would take primacy over domestic law. The status of ‘returners’ will 
be protected under the new Home Office Settled Status scheme.  
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B) ADJUDICATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS: OPTIONS FOR THE POST-
BREXIT FUTURE  
Dr Lock welcomed the attendees back to the second session. He outlined that some of this discussion 
might be more speculative, but that it is important to examine regardless. He also noted that it is likely that 
discussion of a British Bill of Rights, which has been put on the back-burner, will return to the forefront in 
due course and therefore is ripe for discussion.   
 
(1) “Content of rights review after Brexit: substance or process?” 
Mr Darren Harvey, University of Edinburgh 
The mere fact that human rights enshrined in legislation or treaties alone is unlikely to be enough to robustly 
protect such rights. There are different political mechanisms for the protection and upholding of human 
rights such as parliamentary input into legislation, select committees and ombudsmen. However, it is 
generally understood and accepted that there is a significant role of national courts in human rights 
protection, and that having human rights enshrined in the treaties is unlikely to be enough. It follows that 
the way in which the judiciary interpret rights has consequences for how rights are protected. The 
substantive content of rights is interpreted by the judiciary and can impact on rights protection. For 
example, in terms of freedom of thought, conscience and religion. When a wide interpretation of the right 
is taken, a wide range of beliefs and people are protected, but where judicial interpretation of this right is 
narrowed down to focus only on the older world religions, quite a lot of people and their beliefs will fall 
outside the realm of protection. Therefore, the scope of the right has been narrowed. The way which these 
rights are defined by courts have a direct effect on how they are protected.   
Presently, the two main sources of human rights protections which we have in the UK are the European 
Convention of Human Rights and the European Charter for Fundamental Rights, both of which are 
interpreted by supranational courts. Those interpretations are either taken into account or are binding on 
UK courts. For example, does prohibition against torture include deporting people to places where they 
might be deported? A question which has been interpreted by courts as to substantive content of those 
rights. Typically, both courts have taken a wide interpretation of these rights, and these judgements have 
been taken into account in British courts. However, the UK is now leaving the European Union, so the 
first major consequence of Brexit is that the British parliament have recently taken the decision not to 
implement the Charter, despite the House of Lords’ objections29 and a division in the House of Commons 
                                                          
29 The Guardian, More Brexit defeats for No 10 in Lords amid reports of cabinet split, available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/apr/23/theresa-may-suffers-third-brexit-defeat-in-lords  
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on the same issue30. It might well be the case that certain rights within the Charter will require to be brought 
into domestic law. One way in which substantive rights could be lost is by not having them, by virtue of 
the removal of the Charter, but another consequence of this eschewing of the Charter is that these rights 
may still exist but could be interpreted in a narrower way than the European Court of Justice has 
traditionally interpreted. We could incorporate all the rights in the Charter into domestic legislation, but 
parliament could tell courts how to interpret the rights and narrow them down in future. Through this 
process, rights may not be translated perfectly, or might reduce their application, or substantive content.  
The second point is the wider political climate of the Convention. Many people in politics and Brexit have 
taken Brexit as an opportunity to bring up the ECHR again and perceive it be worth examining relationship 
between courts, legislature and executive. Many people are discussing the proposed British Bill of rights, 
whilst more and more academics are publishing commentary on this topic. 
The British Bill of Rights envisioned in Conservative party policy31 would boil down to the repeal of the 
Human Rights Act, breaking the link between UK and Strasbourg and instead, British courts will interpret 
rights as parliament tells them. The proponents of the Bill want to clarify rights to reflect proper balance 
between rights and responsibilities. This will ensure that they are applied with the original intentions of the 
Convention, not how the have been interpreted over the last half of a century. This could be seen to be 
changing the substantive content of rights. These proponents also want to limit the use of human rights to 
the most serious cases, criminal law, property law. There will be a threshold below which human rights are 
not engaged at all.  
This is a reassertion of the parliament and executive, what the government seems to feel are creeping judicial 
power. Harvey referred to the ‘Judicial Power Project’, a right-wing group who find judicial interpretation 
and discretion worrying.32 Many of their academics and members give evidence to parliament. They have 
taken Brexit as an opportunity to revisit the relationship. Some desired changes include the parliament 
legislating to reverse judgements, derogating from ECHR under Art 15, restricting judicial review and 
legislating to restore greater ministerial functions. Attitude that current human rights systems needs to be 
revisited in way where courts are no longer in driving seat, but parliament defines when rights are engaged.  
A separate issue on substance is when rights are engaged, they can be counterbalanced against general 
concerns of the community, such as proportionality. This ability to counterbalance is apparently 
unacceptable to many, as it allows for too much judicial discretion. Again, the substantive content of the 
                                                          
30 Hansard, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2018 Division 183, available at 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2018-06-13/division/1E74572F-9227-40C9-BF4C-
589A3F09571C/EuropeanUnion(Withdrawal)Bill?outputType=Names  
31 The Conservative Party, Protecting human rights in the UK: The Conservatives’ proposals for changing 
Britain’s human rights law,  https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/files/.../human_rights.pdf  
32 See here: http://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/  
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right, could then be reduced, if rights are worthy of less protection and are only hauled up when “manifestly 
unreasonable” only.  
To conclude, the substance part of ‘definition’ and ‘adjudication of infringements’ have been focused upon 
in this presentation and in the speaker’s opinion, such developments over the last few years are somewhat 
alarming.  
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(2) “Human rights reform: adjudication and enforcement of economic social and cultural 
rights?” 
Dr Katie Boyle, University of Stirling 
Introduction  
Boyle introduced her presentation with four questions relating to human rights reform through the lens of 
Scotland, asking the attendees to reflect on these. There is a danger that the UK as a whole is on a different 
level to the devolved jurisdictions. As the UK is engaging in supranational issues in relation to sovereignty, 
it is in growing risk of further fragmenting the United Kingdom. It must be said much of the discussions 
is speculative, when engaging with human rights in future, and post-Brexit future, which rights and remedies 
will exist. However, it is important to ask questions about which structures will exist in such a future.  
1) What kind of constitutional legal structures are possible within the limited competence of 
devolution at the devolved level and within the unique constitutional arrangements at the UK 
national level?  
2) What roles can be played by the different institutions of governance, namely the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary in the enforcement of human rights, in particular, in relation to 
economic, social and cultural rights?  
3) What is required of a legal culture that facilitates the adjudication and enforcement of human rights, 
reflecting on what this means including types of rights, duties, degrees of review which might be 
applied by the court and what is meant by effective remedies?  
4) What are the potential barriers to human rights reform and the enforcement of economic and 
social rights through adjudication?  
Case study: Northern Ireland  
Boyle outlined that she had previously examined the enforcement (or lack of) on human rights in Northern 
Ireland. She considered the whether a lack of enforcement of such rights could have an impact on peace in 
a conflicted democracy environment. Through this lens, it became clear that the rights structures that exist 
in the UK and Northern Ireland only covers a selection of the rights available at an international level. It 
can therefore be said that these jurisdictions’ treatment of human rights does not reflect the full body of 
international human rights law, only taking rules from the European Convention on Human Rights or from 
EU law. Subsequently having done work with the Human Rights Commission, she considered this question 
across the other UK jurisdictions, assessing a major gap at the domestic level compared with what is 
envisaged at the international level.  
Economic, social and cultural rights 
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A question therefore arises – does enforcement of economic and social rights take place? Such rights can 
be classified generally as those covering health, education, social security employment and housing. 
However, these rights tend to be shoehorned into other enforcement mechanisms in the UK. There might 
be a statutory framework, such as the ‘National Minimum Wage’, but when measured against international 
human rights law, the UK position falls short of what is expected internationally. Conversely, the UK would 
say that this was an example of the UK meeting its social, economic and cultural rights.  
These rights can be enforced through the common law. For example, Lady Hale introduced ‘best interest’ 
of the child, referring to the International Convention for the Rights of the Child in ZH Tanzania33. In the 
UNISON34 case on tribunal fees, the Court outlined what it is to have a social minimum, in respect of 
allowing access to justice to employment tribunals through removing tribunal fees once more. Economic, 
social and cultural rights are also adjudicated upon in the realm of equality law. The Equality Act 2010 has 
facilitated this. If businesses do not comply with the public-sector equality duty, the court can quash their 
decision.35 However, it should be minded that this is not a substantive right, merely a procedural one.  
Boyle summarised that politicising economic, social and cultural rights takes place at all levels, but with 
insufficient protections compared with the international dimension. She highlighted that perhaps this 
difference in protection can help us understand why remedies differ in different jurisdictions. Depending 
on the law on which you are relying, the remedy may be different. A question therefore arises as to what 
could be lost in relation to remedies.  
What could happen in future?  
Prior to the EU referendum, we could envisage increased adjudication., such as membership of 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Giving better access to 
remedies could also have been guaranteed through a renewed constitutional arrangement, with clearer rules 
for courts on what expected in terms of what is protected and how to be enforced.  
Prior to the referendum, it was noted that there were small discrepancies between different jurisdictions in 
UK. Depending on where you live, there might be different types of remedies. Devolution engages very 
much with economic, social and cultural rights.  
Given that we are facing significant changes under Brexit, and also the Bill of Rights, there is much more 
major constitutional upheaval at play. The slight differences could result in much bigger changes.  
There has also been discussion in light of the British Bill of Rights, as to whether protection should or can 
be different in the devolved jurisdictions, for example, there is already a duty to have due regard to 
convention on rights of child in Wales, and is Scotland, security is considered to be a human right. 
                                                          
33 ZH (Tanzania) (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4 
34 UNISON v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51 
35 Equality Act 2010, s149  
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Therefore, the devolved jurisdictions are already more progressive than the UK-wide treatment of human 
rights.  
Furthermore, in Northern Ireland, human rights are foundational. This is as a result of the Peace Agreement 
and international treaty which the UK signed up to. We can also consider the Supreme Court case relating 
to abortion in Northern Ireland.36 This highlights a disjointed approach to healthcare across the 
jurisdictions. Human rights are left as ‘bargaining tools’ in politics. Scotland appears to be committed to 
protecting human rights and Wales has already taken steps in that regard. However, it appears that the UK, 
when considered as a whole, is entering a space of regression.  
Conclusion  
It is important to consider what arrangements might exist in the future and how adjudication might operate. 
It is necessary to think about the substance of rights and remedies facilitated. If no remedies are available, 
then there is no enforcement. Secondly, when the EU Continuity Bill goes before the court, there is a clause 
which seeks to retain the remedy to disapply Acts of the Scottish Parliament which are incompatible with 
retained EU law, including the Charter. This means that Holyrood are attempting to restrict its own 
competence in future. Ultimately, what will this mean for people who live in different areas of the UK and 
have access to different rights depending on where they live.  
 
  
                                                          
36 Trinity Term [2018] UKSC 27 
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(3) “Brexit and the interpretation of domestic rights.” 
Niall O’Connor, University of Essex 
What do we mean by domestic rights? 
It has never been possible to distinguish between EU rights and domestic rights. Firstly, there are certain 
types of EU law, such as directives, which must be implemented into national law before they can take 
effect, therefore these laws become domestic from the moment they are introduced into that member state 
by domestic legislation. Secondly, the European Communities Act 1972 instructs member states to 
implement EU law as if it were national law.  
Post-Brexit, any distinction between domestic and EU disappears. This is because the EU Withdrawal Act 
expressly domesticates certain EU rights. We will then have ‘pure domestic law’ which does not come from 
Europe and therefore will not be affected by Brexit. The second category is ‘retained EU law,’ that which 
has been domesticated – aspects of treaties and EU law.  
Interpretation of domestic rights  
Firstly, why does a right need to be interpreted? Legal sources may require to be interpreted due to a lack 
of clarity or some substantive gaps to be filled. Judicial interpretation can be controversial. This is because 
judges are usually unelected, and, especially in the case of supranational courts, some might accuse them of 
interfering in domestic decision making.  
There are different approaches to interpretation. British courts tend to take a literal approach. This means 
that they base their interpretation on the actual wording of text. Conversely, EU courts take a purposive 
approach, considering the wording firstly, but also looking at the purpose and objectives of rights, 
interpreting in accordance with these objectives. This purposive approach is not unsurprising, given that 
there are 24 official languages of the EU, therefore it can be difficult for a given word to mean the same in 
all Member States and in all languages. As a rule, EU law is often drafted in very general terms meaning 
that such terms can be left to Member states to interpret and apply as they see fit. The European Court of 
Justice confirmed their approach in van Gend & Loos37, when interpreting treaties, it is necessary to consider 
the “spirit, general scheme and the wording” of the treaty. The Court also takes the same approach when 
interpreting EU legislation.  
Working Time Directive  
O’Connor moved on to focus on employment law, due to its susceptibility to changes post-Brexit, taking 
the Working Time Directive as an example. The 4th recital to the Directive reads: The improvement of 
workers' safety, hygiene and health at work is an objective which should not be subordinated to purely 
                                                          
37 ECLI:EU:C:1963:1. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3235249 
BREN: The adjudication and enforcement of rights after Brexit 
Compiled by Laura Bremner 
 
21 
 
economic considerations.”38 The ECJ has repeatedly held that the Directive must be applied in accordance 
with this objective, but also refers to human rights objectives. In ANGED v FASGA39, the Court referred 
to Art 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights40, confirming its worker friendly approach in relation to 
the Directive.  
Directives need to be implemented by Member States, the UK’s implementation took the form of the 
Working Time Regulations 1998. These are domestic law, and British courts have responsibility for 
interpreting the legislation, but are not given a free hand. As the Regulations are implementing EU law, 
they fall within the scope of EU law. There are two consequences to this. The first is when a national court 
is interpreting law which implements EU law, it must use the same purposive approach as the ECJ, because 
national law within the scope of EU law, must be interpreted insofar as possible with EU law. The second 
consequence is that if national courts have a doubt as to the underlying directive, they may be required to 
ask for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ. If a piece of legislation is within scope of EU law, even though 
domestic law, it must be implemented insofar as possible with EU law.  
Outside of this, national courts are entirely free to take their own approach to interpretation, and as already 
highlighted, British courts take a literal approach, and generally only depart from the wording if it is unclear. 
The judiciary have relied upon contract law tests, applying these in the employment law context, even if 
such tests are not outlined in legislation. This can sometimes undermine the employee protective purpose 
of the legislation. When we consider unfair dismissal, courts grant significant leeway to employers in 
deciding whether a dismissal was reasonable, using the ‘band of reasonable responses’ test.41 This could be 
argued to ignore the employee-friendly purpose of the legislation.  
Judicial interpretation post-Brexit  
The question therefore arises, will UK courts apply a non-purposive approach to EU derived domestic law. 
The answer is of course – maybe? The EU (Withdrawal) Act sets out that domestic law (which derived 
originally from the EU) is now domestic law.42  Seemingly, British courts may now be free to use literal 
approach in their application to the Working Time Regulations, for example.  
Furthermore, there is no need to apply domestic law, having regard to EU law, nor is there a requirement 
or ability to refer a question to the Court of Justice – domestic courts become the sole interpreter of rights 
in the UK.43 However, national courts should interpret retained EU law in accordance with existing ECJ 
                                                          
38 Working Time Directive (2003/88/EC). 
39 [2012] IRLR 779. 
40 “Every worker has the right to limitation of maximum working hours, to daily and weekly rest periods and to 
an annual period of paid leave.” Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 31(2). 
41 See Iceland Frozen Foods Ltd v Jones [1982] ICR 17, per Browne-Wilkinson J at 24F-25A. 
42 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, s2. 
43 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, s6(1). 
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case law, and this includes the purposive approach. The court can also have regard to future EU law if it 
wishes to do so.44 
However, domestic courts can depart from existing ECJ case law if it considers it ‘right to do so.’45 Finally, 
the 2018 Act also removes the Charter as a tool of interpretation.46 
Conclusion  
The effect of Brexit on rights interpretation is yet unclear, but what we do know that it will be solely British 
judges interpreting such rights. The purposive approach to rights may also be lost over time. However, 
British courts have historically looked to other jurisdiction to help interpret rights, and this will probably 
continue. A more urgent issue is that EU law has been removed from the hierarchy of norms, meaning that 
courts can weaken or depart from EU rights.  
 
 
  
                                                          
44 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, s6(1). 
45 Ibid, s6(5)  
46 Ibid, s6(6). 
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(4) Discussion 
Separation of powers  
Firstly, the issue of the separation of powers, namely the judiciary, legislature and executive, was raised. It 
was suggested that the contempt towards the jurisdiction of the ECJ is perhaps also adding to this concern 
that the British courts have too much power in terms of their judicial discretion.  
It was suggested that if rights are defined more restrictively in legislation, then this shifts more power to 
the executive. Some people do argue that the judiciary in the UK have too much power. A British Bill of 
Human Rights could well create this shift, and there was a consensus that such a shift could well be deeply 
problematic.  
Boyle added that she hoped such changes would happen on an informed and evidence-led basis but that 
such restricting or defining of rights from the executive could have an adverse impact on enjoyment of 
rights. It was also suggested that the position is different with the Welsh Assembly and Scottish Parliament 
because they are unicameral, therefore there are more mechanisms to ensure accountability.  
General comments on Brexit and the Charter  
In general, it was suggested that the executive in the UK appear to be making a big push for power and are 
using Brexit as a stepping stone. It was highlighted that this is a rather worrying trend. It was suggested that 
the Labour MPs abstaining from voting on amendments to the Withdrawal Bill was also concerning.47 The 
Withdrawal Act was also cited as the ‘embodiment of a power grab’ by one attendee.   
Again, the Charter and its role was considered, however, the discussion moved onto the concern that it 
may not really make sense in the UK, if we are no longer members of the EU. The Charter and EU law in 
general is irrelevant if we can remove or alter it, as seen through the supremacy of the EU falling away. 
The British Bill of Rights 
It was suggested that if a British Bill of Rights was drawn up, with those rights being drafted in quite general 
terms, this could still allow for judicial interpretation of terms. However, if domestic legislation tells judges 
exactly what to do, they will have no real discretion and will simply have to apply the rights in the way 
which the statue tells them to do. For example, if the judiciary are told that the right to private life covers 
only particular situations, then this would take away a lot of discretion from the judiciary.  
It was queried whether there were proposals for the UK to leave the ECHR. Theresa May previously had 
suggested the UK would no longer be part of the Convention at all, however the position is still vague at 
                                                          
47 The Guardian, EU withdrawal bill: Labour rebels abstain or vote with government 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/sep/12/eu-withdrawal-bill-labour-rebels-abstain-or-vote-with-
government Accessed 24/07/18. 
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present. The prospect of a British Bill of Rights was considered many years ago by academics, however the 
proposal was that such a Bill would mean a ‘scraping back of rights.’  
The parliamentary process involving the Withdrawal Act has been worrying. The constitutional impact of 
this has been seismic. In order to function as a democracy, the UK may need to create a written constitution. 
If the two pillars of democracy are removed, you are essentially changing what it is to be a citizen within a 
state. Courts will be reluctant to engage beyond what the parliament tells them to. The change in the 
separation of powers might need to be written down.  
It was reiterated that security considerations are just too important and given that this is a critical point 
within the Withdrawal Agreement, could prevent the UK from leaving the ECHR. It was also highlighted 
that it might be easier to discuss human rights and the ECHR in Scotland, rather than in London, where it 
is rather difficult to discuss such issues.  
Moving back to consider this in the context of Northern Ireland, the Peace Agreement is dependent on 
retaining the ECHR. This left the question open as to whether it would be necessary to enforce a different 
human rights regime for England, compared to the other countries within the UK.  
It was also reiterated that there is a difference between procedural and substantive duties in the human 
rights context. There is a tendency for the European Court of Human Rights to remove substantive 
obligations with procedural obligations, such as with right to life, there is a procedural obligation to protect 
and if someone is killed, and an investigation is carried out, this discharges the responsibility under the 
Convention.  
Hypothetically, it was considered that the way to reduce rights as a government would be to bring in more 
procedural obligations, then it makes it harder to claim for breaches of rights. There would also be less 
opportunity for judicial review. It was also highlighted that it would be difficult to create a written 
constitution.  
Generally, it was also suggested that the changes in opinion regarding the European Union have been 
bubbling away since the 1980s, considering for example industrial restructuring, and this discontent may 
have been suspended until the economic crisis.  
 
